BECOMING CITIZENS IN ISRAEL: A DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETY. CIVIC ORIENTATIONS IN HEBREW AND ARAB SCHOOLS.[1]

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Abstract

Israel participated in the IEA Civic Education study, testing a representative sample of 11th graders in Hebrew and Arab academic state schools. A questionnaire was also administered to civics, history, and social sciences teachers within the sampled schools. In this paper I first provide information about how the IEA Civic Education Study was implemented in Israel. Next I proceed to present selected findings to demonstrate how rifts within Israeli society are mirrored in student and teacher citizenship attitudes and perceptions. The Israeli educational system consists of Arab state schools, Hebrew non-religious state schools, and Hebrew religious schools. These educational subsystems cater to diverse publics that are deeply divided over central issues within Israeli society, issues that concern the foundations of Israel as a Jewish-democratic state. Here I focus on the Arab-Jewish divide, an outlining the parameters of this rift within Israeli society, and then to demonstrating how this divide permeates the schools in ways that affect both the implementation and outcomes of civic education. Thus, I find that although the IEA questionnaire was designed for international comparisons, it can be used to detect issues that are unique to each participating countries. Thus, to more fully exhaust the rich data that has accumulated, the IEA should sponsor the publication of a series of national case studies in addition to providing international comparisons.

INTRODUCTION

There has been a growing awareness of the potential tensions between multiculturalism and the virtues and practices of democratic citizenship and national unity (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000; Samson, 1999; Parekh, 1994). Studies have shown that forming an affinity with one's country is often more problematic for national and ethnic minorities than for those who form the dominant group (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Smith & Jakko, 2001; Coakley, 1990).

Israeli society offers an interesting case study for observing how social, cultural, and national heterogeneity determine citizenship orientations. A major attribute of Israeli society are the wide and deep rifts between religious and non-religious groups, between Israeli Arabs and Jews, between the political left and right, and between the rich and the poor. These divides, which often intersect and overlap, represent contesting visions of Israel as a Jewish-democratic state and profoundly shape Israel's political culture. This article focuses on the divide between Israeli Arabs and Jews, and examines manifestations of this rift in citizenship orientations of a representative national sample of Israeli 11th graders. I'll begin by discussing the major features of the national rift and its anticipated consequences for citizenship orientations of both Israeli Jews and Arabs. I'll then proceed to describe how the IEA Civic Education Study was implemented in Israel, and present selected findings based on the Israeli data.

THE NATIONAL RIFT: ISRAELI ARABS AND JEWS

The rift that divides Arabs and Jews is multidimensional and includes issues that are related to social inequality, the desire of Israeli Arabs for cultural autonomy, positions taken on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, acceptance of the legitimacy of Israel to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state, and collective identities (Smooha, 1984; Rouhana, 1997).

Arabs who remained in Israel following the establishment of the State constituted a minority of about 13 percent of the total Israeli population and at present forms about 18 percent of the entire Israeli population (Lissak, 2000). Israel is the only country in the Middle East where Arabs constitute a minority. The Arab population of Israel became citizens of a state whose creation they had forcefully opposed together with their brothers in the neighboring Arab countries, regarding it as an illegitimate infringement upon their national rights. It is therefore not surprising that Arabs who remained in Israel were initially treated as an enemy-affiliated, untrustworthy minority. Consequently, between 1948-1966, they were subjugated to a military administration and martial law that limited their civil liberties (Lustick, 1980; Gurr, 1993). Their movement was restricted and special permits were needed in order to look for jobs or education outside their hometowns (Zureik, 1979; Smooha, 1985). This period signified imposed segregation between Arabs and Jews, and total control over the Arab population (Lissak, 2000).

Following the Six Day War, Israeli Arabs could maintain contacts with their Palestinian brothers on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Over the years Israeli Arabs increasingly tended to form their own political parties, instead of voting for Jewish parties, or Arab parties that were the offshoot of such parties. From 1967 Israeli Arabs became more integrated into Israeli society, on the one hand, while their national Palestinian identity has been strengthened, on the other (Smooha, 1984; Lissak, 2000; Rouhana, 1997). Islamic fundamentalism also gained strong hold among wide segments of the Israeli Arab population, as a form of collective identity. The issue of identity of Israeli Arabs is salient and problematic especially during periods of war. As a former Israeli Arab leader put it, the tragedy is that my country

(Israel) is at war with my people (the Arabs). The end of the military administration did not solve the issue of Arab integration into Israeli society, nor that of their civic, cultural and national identity as citizens of a Jewish-Zionist state. Similarly, contacts with non-Israeli Palestinians following the Six Day War did not resolve identity concerns, as Israeli Arabs are torn between their affinity with Israel being Israeli citizens, and affinity with Palestinian Arabs being part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation (Lissak, 2000).

Until recently, the optimal model for Arab integration into Israeli society was considered by both Jews and Arabs to be cultural pluralism, which encouraged the creation of ethnic enclaves, allowing minorities to preserve their culture and allowing their partial or full participation in the affairs of the larger community. Thus, institutional separateness and minimalist demands upon the Arab citizen have characterized the relations between the central government and the Israeli-Arab minority. For example, unlike Israeli Druze for whom military service is obligatory, and Bedouins who volunteer to serve in the Israel Defense Forces, Arabs do not serve in the army. This practice was adopted for both security reasons and in order to avoid a situation in which Israeli Arabs could find themselves fighting their own kin. Securing the necessary basic conditions for cooperative coexistence in the case of Israeli Arabs has also been problematic (Smooha, 1985; Ichilov 1988). The national symbols of the State of Israel represent Jewish themes that are not an acceptable form of Israeli identity for the Arab minority. The flag shows the Star of David, and the national emblem shows the Menorah of the Temple. The national anthem describes the yearnings of the Jews during two thousand years of exile to return to their homeland. Its last verse is "to be an independent nation in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem." The absence of a more general, more diffused Israeli identity makes it difficult to create shared ideology between Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens. Arab cultural autonomy, which was perceived as potentially capable of fostering an alien national identity, has been discouraged. Nor is there any proportional equality of resources between Jews and Arabs in Israel when most of the State's resources are allotted to national security, immigration absorption, and settlement. Arab exemption from military service limits their opportunities, because army veterans enjoy special privileges in housing and loans and in education and vocational training, for example. Enduring interpersonal relations between Jews and Arabs are difficult to achieve in a situation where no common ideology exists, national identity is salient to both national groups, and there is a mutual atmosphere of alienation and distrust. The protracted occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian uprisings, especially the recent one that erupted at what seemed like a successful completion of a peace process, and the protracted state of war between Israel and her Arab neighbors, represent continuing obstacles to the emergence of an Arab-Israeli identity (Rekhess, 1989; Lissak, 2000).

A major sign of communal rift in plural societies is when the legitimacy for the existence of a state and/or its constitutional foundations is being contested. Concerning Israel, neither Israel's right to exist nor its Jewish-Zionist character is recognized by much of the Arab world. Israeli Arabs are under cross-pressures, being simultaneously citizens of the state of Israel and part of the Arab world and the

Palestinian people. During the last two decades there has been a burgeoning research interest in the Palestinian citizens of Israel, a term that appears to express the self-definition of Israeli-Arabs. The change from Arabs to Palestinians is not simply a semantic matter, but signifies changes in the collective identity of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. There is a wide agreement among scholars that since 1967 Israeli-Palestinians have undergone a radicalization process that involves the strengthening of the Palestinian national identity, and a concomitant weakening of the Israeli civic identity (Landau, 1993; Rekhess, 1976,1989; Rouhana, 1997). The 1987 Palestinian uprising greatly fostered the Palestinian identity of Israeli Arabs. Schiff and Ya'ari (1990) comment that the uprising unsettled Israeli Arabs more than any crisis since the Six Day War of 1967. Arabs of Israel were in full sympathy with the Palestinian insurgents, sent food and drugs into the territories, held protest rallies, contributed to special emergency funds, and donated blood (p. 170).

In recent years there has been a growing demand among Israeli Palestinian Arabs to be recognized as a national, not merely a cultural minority, entitled to self-administration of its cultural affairs. Arabs also wish to divest Israel of its Zionist-Jewish characteristics, and turn Israel into "a state for all its citizens." This means that Israel will no longer be the state of the Jewish people, and will have to rid itself of all Jewish national symbols, the anthem as well as of the Law of Return that recognizes the right of all Jews to return to their ancestral homeland. This has raised concerns among Jews that the Palestinian citizens of Israel are attempting to liquidate the Jewish state through the exercise of the civil and political rights that are granted within Israel's democracy.

Smooha's (1984) survey findings among Israeli-Arabs clearly demonstrate a problematic situation for both Israeli Jews and Arabs. Only fifty percent of Arab respondents recognized unconditionally the right of Israel to exist, twenty-one percent categorically rejected this right, and twenty-nine percent expressed "reservations" (p. 35). Similarly, sixty-four percent agreed that Zionism is a racist movement, about sixty-four percent agreed that the Law of Return should be repealed, and about forty-seven percent doubted that "Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and can identify themselves with the state" (p. 36).

The radicalization of Israeli Palestinian Arabs thus stems from multiple sources, such as: the unresolved Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict; Palestinian nationalism; Muslim fundamentalism; rising Arab modernization which increases deprivation as family and community needs grow faster than resources; the Zionist-Jewish character of Israel which does not allow Arabs to identify with the state; and large-scale discriminatory policies against Arabs (Smooha, 1989, p. 218).

Studies reveal that both the younger Israeli Jewish and Arab generations are more nationally militant, and hold more extremist views than their parents (Liebes & Ribak, 1993). What are the prospects for containing the rift between Jews and Israeli Palestinians? Could the opposing views and desires on fundamental issues irrupt into a violent conflict? I argue that bridging the national rift greatly depends upon the emergence of a civic identity that is shared by Arabs and Jews. It should be noted that citizenship consists of particularistic and universal dimensions. In Israel the

particularistic dimension represents the "Jewishness" of the State, while the universalistic dimension embodies Israel's democratic foundations.

My point of departure is that the nature and content of educational influences concerning citizenship are structured by various social contexts. Thus, civic orientations and knowledge of individual students are to be understood within the larger social aggregates of which they are part. The Israeli educational system consists of Arab state schools, Hebrew non-religious state schools, and Hebrew religious schools. These educational subsystems cater to diverse publics that are deeply divided over central issues within Israeli society, issues that concern the foundations of Israel as a Jewish-democratic state. I expect these rifts to permeate the schools in ways that may have an effect on both the implementation and outcomes of civic education.

The major purpose of the present study is to examine differences between Israeli Jewish and Arab youngsters on issues that could reflect rifts within Israeli society, as well as citizenship domains that could potentially bridge existing divides. More specifically:

- How politicized and radicalized are Israeli Arab and Jewish youngsters?

- How supportive are they of the parochial aspects of Israeli citizenship?

- How knowledgeable and supportive are they of universalistic democratic principles?

THE STUDY

Sample. The target population consisted of the age cohort of 16 years to 16 years and 11 months at the time of the study, who were 11th grade students within Israeli state high schools. Data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics estimate that the target population includes about eighty percent of the relevant age cohort (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000).

Uniform sampling procedures were set for all participating countries in the IEA Civic Education Study, using a two-stage stratified cluster design. At the first stage, schools were sampled using a probability proportional to size (Foy, Rust and Schleicher, 1996). At the second stage the sample consisted of one intact classroom per school from the target grade (grade 11). Sampled schools were drawn from a database that was provided by the Ministry of Education. The final sample consisted of 5847 eleventh graders in 157 Hebrew schools and in 76 Arab schools. The total number of students assessed was 4430, representing participation rate of 83 percent (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002).

Questionnaires. The data was collected using a questionnaire that was developed by the International Steering Committee of the IEA in collaboration with the participating countries, and in Israel was translated from English into both Hebrew and Arabic. The final version of the test was preceded by an elaborate process of piloting, and was adopted based primarily on confirmatory factor analysis and IRT modeling, indicating a high quality test across countries (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt & Nikolova, 2002). The alpha reliability of the civic knowledge

test in Israel was .77. The items were designed to assess knowledge of civic content as well as skills in interpretation of material with civic or political content, including short-text passages and cartoons.

RESULTS

Selected findings will be presented first regarding the degree of politicization of Israeli Arab and Jewish youngsters. Students' politicization will be assessed by examining several patterns of involvement and activism. I expect Arab respondents and Jewish respondents in the more nationalist religious state schools to be more politicized than their counterparts in regular Hebrew state schools.

I will proceed to examine parochial and universalistic citizenship orientations. The parochial dimension consists of students' reactions to issues that are controversial within the Israeli context. Most of these issues, as will be explained in more detail, are related to the Jewish-national attributes of Israel. These include national pride, immigration, and the use of military power. I expect students in Arab and Hebrew school to differ on these issues. Similarly, I expect students in Hebrew religious state schools to differ from students in regular Hebrew state schools on some of these issues. Following the analysis of particularistic citizenship orientations I will proceed to examine the degree to which universalistic democratic orientations are shared by students. As was mentioned earlier, shared democratic orientations could facilitate the emergence of a common civil identity that is vital for bridging gaps within Israeli society.

I. Students' politicization

I will begin by examining how often students are engaged in discussions of national and international politics with peers, adult family members and teachers, and how often they follow national and international events in the written and broadcasted media, and on the Internet. This will be followed by an examination of the intensity of organizational participation of youngsters, and by the kind of activities that they expect to be engaged in as adults. I consider these attitudinal and behavioral parameters as manifestations of the degree to which students are politicized.

L.1. Discussing politics. Data concerning the frequency of discussing national and international politics is presented in Table 1.

The data reveal that, overall, politics is not frequently discussed with peers, teachers, and family members. Students seek information about national and international politics mainly through the media. However, Arab students discuss politics with friends, teachers and parents more often than students in Hebrew schools. International comparison reveals that the percentage of Israeli students who 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement: "I am interested in politics" was higher than that of the average international sample (58% as compared with 49%). Israeli students were also above the international mean in reading newspaper articles about "our country," and listening to news broadcasts on the radio. They were below the international mean watching news on TV (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfeldt & Nikolova, 2002, pp. 108, 111).

Table 1: Frequency of Discussing Politics*

	Type of School	M	S.D	N	d.f.	F	η^2
Peers Alpha=.71	State	2.42	.76	2931	2,5481	30.68***	1.1%
	Religious	2.55	.72	727			
	Arab	2.60	.84	1826			
Parents Alpha=.76	State	2.76	.80	2929	2,5483	11.80***	0.4%
	Religious	2.75	.77	728			
	Arab	2.87	.84	1829			
Teachers Alpha=.79	State	2.13	.81	2927	2,5450	163.56***	5.7%
	Religious	2.14	.78	725			
	Arab	2.56	.84	1801			
Media use Alpha=.72	State	3.17	.62	2913	2,5424	37.07***	1.3%
	Religious	3.18	.60	724			
	Arab	3.02	.63	1790			

* P<0.05 .   ** P<0.01 .   *** P<0.001
*In Table 1, results of one-way analyses of variance are presented. Scores ranged from 1-4. The higher the score, the more frequently politics is being discussed.

L.2. Participation in Organizations. Table 2 provides information on the number of organizations in which students are active. School-related activities include school clubs and student government organizations. Organizations that are not school related included community, cultural, ethnic, environmental, human rights and political organizations, youth movements and UN clubs. Students were also asked how intensively they engaged in the various activities of the organizations in which they participate, ranging from "almost every day" to "never." The data is presented in Table 3.

Table 2: Students' Participation in Organizations (Number of Organizations)*

	Type of School	M	S.D.	F(2,5704)	η^2
School Related Activities	State	1.91	1.41	222.54***	7.2%
	Religious	1.92	1.33		
	Arab	2.79	1.67		
School Unrelated Activities	State	1.96	1.47	78.73***	2.7%
	Religious	2.55	1.77		
	Arab	2.47	1.79		
Overall	State	3.87	2.40	164.03***	5.4%
	Religious	4.47	2.62		
	Arab	5.27	3.01		

***p<0.001
The data are based on analyses of variance.

Table 3: Frequency of Organizational Participation*

Type of School	M	S.D.	F(2,5436)	η²
State	2.70	2.05		
Religious	2.76	.94	8.76***	0.3%
Arab	2.59	.93		

***p<0.001

* The data are based on analyses of variance. Scores ranged between 1=almost every day, to 4=never. Thus, the lower the score, the more intensively students participate in organizations.

The data reveal that the overall organizational participation of Arab students is greater than that of students in both types of Hebrew schools. This is also the case concerning school-related activities. Also, students in both religious and Arab schools are more active than students in state schools in organizations that are not associated with the school. The data also reveal that Arab students are more frequently engaged in the various organizational activities as compared with students in both types of Hebrew schools. Differences are fairly small, but statistically significant. International comparison reveal that based on students' self-report, Israeli students participated more than the mean international sample in civic-related organizations (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfeldt & Nikolova, 2002, p. 138).

L.3. Anticipated Political Actions. Youngsters were asked about their likelihood to be engaged in a variety of activities as adults. The activities were grouped into four categories. "Active participation" included party membership, writing a letter to a newspaper, and being a candidate for office. "Illegal protest activities" included protest actions such as spray-painting protest slogans on walls, blocking traffic, and occupying public buildings. "Involvement in social causes" included volunteer community work to help poor or elderly people, and collecting money for various causes. The "conventional actions" category included voting, for example.

The data reveal that most students expect to take part mainly in conventional actions. This trend is stronger among students in Hebrew schools than among Arab students. Students in Arab schools scored significantly higher than students in both types of Hebrew schools on the active participation scale, involvement in social causes scale, and illegal protest actions scale. Students in religious schools scored higher than students in regular state schools on the active participation and involvement in causes scales.

International comparisons concerning students' reports on expected political activities as adults reveal that Israeli students were above the international sample on voting in national elections, collecting money for causes, and participating in non-violent protest. Israeli students were above the international mean in expected participation in conventional political activities, and did not significantly differ from the international mean on expected illegal protest activities (Amadeo, Tornry-Purta, Lehman, Husfedt & Nikolova, 2002, pp. 116, 119, 122).

*Table 4: Anticipated Political Actions**

	Type of School	M	S.D	N	d.f.	F	η^2
Conventional Actions Alpha= .58	State Religious Arab	3.34 3.39 3.10	.65 .61 .89	2861 713 1748	2,5319	70.43***	2.6%
Active Participation Alpha= .76	State Religious Arab	1.76 1.82 2.03	.65 .64 .78	2710 635 1678	2,5020	80.90***	3.1%
Involvement in Social Causes Alpha= .74	State Religious Arab	2.53 2.77 2.91	.64 .60 .64	2592 621 1673	2,4883	179.83***	6.9%
Illegal Protest Actions Alpha= .80	State Religious Arab	1.45 1.44 1.57	.63 .60 .73	2811 687 1754	2,5249	19.51***	0.7%

* P<0.05 .   ** P<0.01 .   *** P<0.001
*The data presented in Table 4 is based on one-way analyses of variance.

II. Partisan Orientations

II. 1. National identity and pride. National identity is regarded as a cohesive force that holds nations together and shapes their relations with other nations. National pride is the positive emotion that citizens feel toward their country. It reflects both the sense of esteem that a person has for one's country and the pride or self-esteem that a person derives from one's national identity. National pride is often lower among national minorities (Smith, Jarkko, 2001). I expect that national pride will be much lower among students in Arab schools than among Hebrew school students. Also, it is expected that students in religious Hebrew schools will manifest stronger national pride than students in regular Hebrew state schools. The statements in Table 5 reflect attitudes toward Israel, and the data show the degree to which students are proud, supportive, and fond of their country's historical heritage and its specific achievements.

The data presented in Table 5 clearly reveal the alienation of Arab students who find it difficult to identify with Israel's national anthem and flag, to be proud of the country's history and achievements, and to express love for the country. Additional analyses reveal that although students in both types of Hebrew schools expressed overall positive attitudes toward Israel, such sentiments were stronger among students in religious state schools. International comparison reveals that Israel was above the international mean score on positive attitudes toward one's nation (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfedt & Nikolova, 2002, p. 97).

Table 5: National Pride

Item	Type of School	M	S.D.	N	d.f.	F	η^2
1. To help protect jobs we should buy products made in Israel	State Religious Arab	2.62 2.86 2.44	.86 .87 .94	2816 698 1662	2,5173	59.23***	2.2%
2. We should keep other countries from trying to influence political decisions in Israel	State Religious Arab	2.88 3.29 2.89	.86 .85 .95	2884 725 1841	2,5447	66.62***	2.4%
3. The flag of Israel is important to me	State Religious Arab	3.55 3.78 2.39	.70 .49 1.13	2974 740 1818	2,5529	1266.98***	31.4%
4. We should always be alert and stop threats from other countries to Israel's political independence	State Religious Arab	3.72 3.82 2.62	.57 .50 1.06	2959 732 1744	2.5432	1311.36***	32.6%
5. Israel deserves respect from other countries for what we have accomplished	State Religious Arab	3.34 3.47 2.58	.74 .68 .99	2915 729 1784	2.5425	548.16***	16.8%
6. There is little to be proud of in Israel's history	State Religious Arab	3.36 3.57 2.47	.78 .69 1.03	2961 737 1798	2,5493	735.61***	21.1%
7. I have great love for Israel	State Religious Arab	3.48 3.71 2.18	.73 .57 1.08	2951 737 1790	2,5475	1568.91***	36.4%
8. People should support their country even if they think their country is doing something wrong	State Religious Arab	3.01 3.26 1.76	.80 .73 .89	2957 737 1862	2,5553	1581.86***	36.3%
9. Israel should be proud of what it has achieved	State Religious Arab	3.33 3.47 2.48	.67 .63 .97	2950 730 1808	2.5485	784.36***	22.2%
10. The national anthem of Israel is important to me	State Religious Arab	3.47 3.67 1.90	.76 .61 1.00	2951 731 1807	2,5486	2287.54***	45.5%
11. I would prefer to live permanently in another country	State Religious Arab	3.08 3.50 2.53	.88 .77 1.11	2835 721 1809	2,5362	326.43***	10.9%
12. We should stop outsiders from influencing Israel's traditions and culture	State Religious Arab	2.64 3.08 2.64	.92 .90 .96	2805 699 1642	2,5143	70.01***	2.7%
Overall Support for Israel (Alpha = .90)	State Religious Arab	3.41 3.61 2.32	3.41 3.61 2.32	2589 663 1482	2,4731	2574.21***	52.1%

* p<0.05 .   ** p<0.01 .   *** p<0.001
*Scores are based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the more supportive of Israel
 students are.
Items were recoded: 1=negative attitude, 4=positive attitude.

II.2. Immigration. The term "immigration" in the IEA questionnaire was translated in Israel to *Aliya*, and "immigrants" to *Olim*. Israel is not generally open to anyone who wants to become an immigrant. *Aliya* and *Olim* refer to Jewish immigrants from diverse countries of origin who under the Law of Return assume full citizenship rights as they set foot in the country. *Aliya* refers to the gathering of the Jewish people in its historical-ancestral homeland, and is considered a central pillar of Zionist ideology. The item that deals with refugees was left as is in both Hebrew and Arabic translations of the questionnaire. One should bear in mind, however, that in the context of Israeli society and the Middle East situation, respondents might have in mind Palestinian refugees when they respond to this item. The Palestinian refugee problem, and how it should be resolved, is one of the most controversial issues in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian and Arab leadership. In other words, the issue of immigrants and refugees represent central ideological controversies that one must bear in mind while examining the data. Given the Israeli situation, one might expect Jewish respondents to be more supportive than Arab respondents of immigration and immigrants. Arab students may also be less supportive of admitting refugees into Israel as long as the Palestinian refugee problem is still pending. Students' perceptions concerning the treatment of *Olim* and refugees are presented in Table 6.

The data presented in Table 6 reveal, as predicted, that students in both types of Hebrew schools were more supportive of immigrant rights and acceptance of refugees than students in Arab schools. Also, students in religious state schools scored higher than students in regular state schools on many of the items.

II.3. Use of military power. Students were asked: "In your opinion, how justified is the use of military force by one country against another for each of the following reasons". The response options were: 1=definitely unjustified; 2=unjustified; 3=justified; 4=definitely justified. The issue of the legitimacy to use military power is highly controversial within Israeli society, especially as far as Israeli Arabs and Jews are concerned. Most Israelis consider the use of military power in the Arab-Israeli wars and in the Palestinian authority territories as preemptive and defensive acts. The Palestinians consider the demolition of houses, uprooting of trees, restricting the movement of civilians, implementing curfews and closures, and the deployment of troops in densely populated Palestinian settlements to be unjustified uses of military power. The Israeli-Palestinian- Arabs identify with the Palestinian cause and with the need to liberate territories and holy places. Thus, territories that have been taken by Israel in the 1967 war are considered, by many Jews, as liberated parts of the biblical Land of Israel, and are viewed by Arabs as occupied land. Control over holy places, such as the Muslim Dome of the Rock place of worship that is built on the most holy site for Jews - the biblical Jewish Temple, is a highly sensitive issue. Calls to liberate Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock are often voiced by Muslim, Palestinian and Arab leaders. It is therefore expected that students in Arab schools would differ from students in Hebrew schools on when the use of military power is justified. Students' opinions concerning the justified use of military power are presented in Table 7.

Table 6: How Should Immigrants (Olim) be Treated?*

Item	*Type of School*	*M*	*S.D.*	*N*	*d.f.*	*F*	η^2
1. Olim should have the opportunity to keep their own language	State Religious Arab	2.95 2.94 2.79	.80 .79 .91	2887 715 1798	2,5397	21.49***	0.8%
2. Olim's children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have	State Religious Arab	3.55 3.62 2.91	.65 .57 .88	2961 740 1819	2,5517	496.78***	15.3%
3. Olim should have the opportunity to vote only after living in Israel for several years	State Religious Arab	2.30 2.41 2.17	.92 .99 .91	2876 711 1827	2,5411	19.40***	0.7%
4. Olim should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and lifestyles	State Religious Arab	3.09 3.11 2.96	.73 .76 .84	2889 714 1806	2,5406	17.47***	0.6%
5. Olim should have the same rights that everyone else in a country has	State Religious Arab	2.98 2.01 2.69	.88 .89 .94	2869 717 1805	2,5388	63.45***	2.3%
6. Olim should be forbidden to engage in political activity	State Religious Arab	3.26 3.30 2.79	.76 .74 .90	2908 725 1799	2,5429	210.90***	7.2%
7. Having many Olim makes it difficult for a country to be united and patriotic	State Religious Arab	2.58 2.61 2.23	.88 .89 .89	2746 677 1708	2,5128	93.35***	3.5%
8. All countries should accept refugees who are trying to escape from wars and political persecution in other countries	State Religious Arab	2.79 2.60 2.41	.91 .92 .98	2721 662 1688	2,5068	87.14***	3.3%

* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001

Items were recoded: 1=strongly agree; 4=strongly disagree. *The data is based on analyses of variance.

The higher the score, the greater the support for immigrants and refugees.

The data reveal that, overall, students in both types of Hebrew schools justified the use of military power more than their Arab counterparts for the purpose of defense, action against terror and nuclear weapons, pre-emptive war, and to enforce UN resolutions. Arab students justified military intervention to retrieve holy places more than students in both types of Hebrew schools. Students in Arab schools and Hebrew religious state schools were similarly supportive, and more supportive than students in Hebrew state schools, of the use of military power to retrieve occupied territories.

Table 7: Justifications for the Use of Military Power*

Item	Type of School	M	S.D.	N	d.f.	F	η^2
1. To enforce compliance with UN resolutions	State Religious Arab	2.41 2.41 1.92	.90 .89 .93	2589 617 1612	2,4815	154.99***	6.0%
2. To defend itself when attacked	State Religious Arab	3.62 3.66 3.05	.64 .62 .92	2874 698 1724	2,5293	348.04***	11.6%
3. To act against terrorist organizations	State Religious Arab	3.62 3.71 2.98	.65 .61 1.00	2862 702 1690	2,5251	421.00**	13.8%
4. To stop violations of human rights	State Religious Arab	3.04 2.95 3.04	.91 .90 .98	2821 680 1718	2,5216	2.82	0.1%
5. To retrieve occupied territories	State Religious Arab	3.00 3.12 3.15	.89 .94 .91	2768 669 1701	2,5135	14.58***	0.6%
6. To prevent a possible future attack	State Religious Arab	3.16 3.25 2.87	.83 .82 .97	2816 684 1694	2,5191	71.31***	2.7%
7. To retrieve holy places	State Religious Arab	2.71 3.00 3.09	.95 .93 .97	2753 669 1696	2,5115	89.73***	3.4%
8. To destroy nuclear and chemical weapons factories	State Religious Arab	3.12 3.27 2.63	.91 .88 1.09	2723 652 1662	2,5034	164.72***	6.1%

* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001

*Data based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the more justified the use of military power.

III. Democratic Orientations

III.1. Strength of democracy and threats for democracy. Students were asked to evaluate the positive and negative effects a number of scenarios may have on democracy. I consider students' ability to reflect on the strengths and threats concerning democracy to reflect a measure of sophisticated knowledge and understanding. The items representing the strength of democracy included freedom of expression, criticism and protest, freedom of the press, and legal fairness. The items representing threats for democracy included nepotism, corruption, and the privileged influence of the wealthy. Also included were statements describing conventional and less conventional forms of citizenship participation, such as membership in political parties, and refusal to obey a law that violates human rights. The results concerning students' ability to identify strengths and threats for democracy are presented in Table 8.

*Table 8: Democracy: Strengths and Threats**

Factor	Type of School	M	S.D.	F	η^2
Strengths of democracy (alpha= .73)	State Religious Arab	3.18 3.13 2.93	.46 .45 .45	180.23***	5.9%
Threats for democracy (alpha= .65)	State Religious Arab	3.47 3.50 3.26	.46 .41 .51	135.06***	4.5%

* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001

*Data based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the better students' ability to recognize strengths and threats.

Although officially there are no correct and incorrect answers for these items, the analyses reveal that students in both types of Hebrew schools identified the strengths and threats for democracy more accurately than students in Arab schools.

III. 2. Concepts of Citizenship. Students were asked to express their opinion concerning how important various attributes for good citizenship in adulthood are. The attributes were grouped into two categories: "Conventional citizenship" which included forms of political participation such as voting, party membership, and information seeking, and "Altruistic citizenship" which included items representing protest and promoting various causes. Students' perceptions of good citizenship are presented in Table 9.

*Table 9: Dimensions of Good Citizenship**

Factor	Type of School	M	S.D.	F(2,5691)	η^2
Conventional Citizenship (alpha= .68)	State Religious Arab	2.66 2.73 2.84	.51 .52 .56	69.27***	2.4%
Altruistic Citizenship (alpha= .69)	State Religious Arab	2.90 3.09 3.38	.58 .56 .52	443.06***	13.5%

*** p<0.001

*Data is based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the more important the specific citizenship dimension is.

The data reveal that students assigned greater importance for good citizenship to the Altruistic Citizenship dimension than to the Conventional Citizenship aspect. However, students in state schools scored lowest on both citizenship dimensions, students in religious schools scored higher than students in state schools, and students in Arab schools assigned to both factors greater importance for good citizenship than students in both types of Hebrew schools. International comparison reveals that the Israeli mean score on both dimensions of citizenship was significantly lower than the international mean (based on 14 countries) (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfedt & Nikolova, 2002, pp 80, 81).

III. 3. Trust in institutions and political efficacy. Students' positions on trust in institutions and efficacy will be examined next. These components are considered vital for the functioning of democratic societies. Citizens should feel competent and efficacious, believe in the responsiveness of the political system, and have faith in democratic institutions. Political efficacy consists of an attitude favoring citizens' attempts to influence government, a belief in the effectiveness of civic action, a belief in the responsiveness of the government to citizens' wishes and demands, and a personal commitment to follow events and to act. In Table 10, data concerning trust in institutions and in the media are presented. The category of trust in institutions represents the overall trust that youngsters expressed toward the government, parliament, the courts, and municipal councils. The category of trust in the media indicates the overall trust of students toward the written and broadcasted media. In Table 11 data concerning students' efficacy are presented. The two categories in the table measure students' feelings about governmental institutions being attentive and responsive to citizens. Such a belief could be an incentive for actively participating in politics and combat feelings of alienation. Also, students' sense of being knowledgeable about politics and personally being able to make a difference is examined.

*Table 10: Trust in Institutions and in the Media**

Scale	Type of School	M	S.D.	N	d.f.	F	η^2
Trust in institutions (alpha = .74)	State	2.53	.47	2534			
	Religious	2.50	.50	581	2,4747	1.71	0.1%
	Arab	2.55	.56	1635			
Trust in the media (alpha = .84)	State	2.67	.67	2961			
	Religious	2.36	.71	732	2,5529	61.55***	2.2%
	Arab	2.55	.77	1839			

* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001
*The data presented is based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the higher the trust in institutions and the media.

Table 11: Results of Analyses of Variance: Political Efficacy Scales.

	Type of School	M	S.D.	N	d.f.	F	η^2
Belief in government (Alpha = .56)	State Religious Arab	2.56 2.52 2.71	.63 .65 .73	2737 670 1705	2,5109	33.77***	1.3%
Personal efficacy (Alpha = .74)	State Religious Arab	2.58 2.59 2.70	.66 .63 .63	2533 601 1600	2,4731	19.00***	0.8%

* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001

*The data presented is based on analyses of variance. The higher the score, the higher the sense of political efficacy.

The data presented in Table 10 reveal that overall the level of trust in institutions among respondents is fairly moderate. Additional data reveal that the courts are most trusted, and political parties are least trusted. Small, but statistically significant, differences by school type were found concerning the Trust in the Media scale. Students in Hebrew state schools expressed the highest trust, followed by Arab students, and students in religious schools expressed the least trust. International comparison reveals that the overall score of trust in the media and in government among Israeli youngsters was significantly lower than the international mean (based on 14 countries). However, overall trust in government-related institutions was slightly higher than the international mean (Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfedt & Nikolova, 2002, p.94, 96).

Data presented in Table 11 reveal that the efficacy level of students was moderate, and that Arab students are more efficacious than students in both types of Hebrew schools.

CONCLUSION

My point of departure was that the nature and content of educational influences concerning citizenship are structured by various social contexts. I argued that civic orientations and knowledge of individual students are to be understood within the larger social aggregates of which they are part. The Israeli educational system consisting of Arab state schools, Hebrew non-religious state schools, and Hebrew religious schools, cater to diverse publics that are deeply divided over issues that concern the foundations of Israel as a Jewish-democratic state. The present study demonstrates how existing rifts permeate the schools in ways that have an effect on youngsters' citizenship orientations.

Growing up in a divided society, where political issues are salient, Israeli youngsters appear to be more politicized than their counterparts in a variety of other countries. Arab students, who belong to a radicalized national minority, are more politicized than their Jewish counterparts as manifested in their greater tendency to discuss politics, in their intensive participation in various organizations, and in their

anticipation to actively participate as adults in social causes and illegal protest actions, in addition to participating in more conventional civic actions.

The major rifts between Jews and Arabs were clearly demonstrated in students' perceptions of the parochial dimensions of citizenship, such as support for Israel and pride in its achievements, history, and national symbols, rights of Jewish immigrants, and the legitimate uses of military power. Arab youngsters were least supportive of Israel, and of the Israeli positions, on all these issues.

The data suggest that strong civil identity, which might provide a measure of cohesion within Israeli society, is not in sight. Arab students had greater difficulties than Jewish students to identify the strengths and threats for democracy. Levels of efficacy and trust are moderately low, and so is the support for conventional and altruistic patterns of citizenship. However, Arab students scored higher than Jewish students on both the conventional and altruistic dimensions of citizenship.

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NOTE

1. The study was financed by the Israeli Ministry of Education.